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Introduction
The late 1990s were characterized by rapidly rising stock prices and lucrative stock options, a spate of IPOs, an increase in venture capital deals, and exceptionally tight labor markets. The NASDAQ rose from 1,059 on January 2, 1996 to 5,049 on March 10, 2000.
Perhaps even more remarkably, the national unemployment rate dropped below 4 percent in April 2000. The late 1990s were also characterized by a marked increase in the use of computers and the Internet by individuals and firms (International Telecommunications Union 2005) .
Silicon Valley, California played a major role in the expansion of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the 1990s, one of the "frequently cited miracles of industrialization in the information technology (IT) era" (Saxenian and Hsu, 2001: 893) . The large concentration of hi-tech industries in the corridor between San Francisco and San Jose became well known, and much emphasis was placed on the role of entrepreneurs and high technology startups in Silicon Valley in contributing to the amazing economic growth of the 1990s. The media dubbed it the "dot com" boom. Conventional wisdom suggested that most people were interested in becoming an entrepreneur or involved in some type of startup.
2 Surprisingly, although the prevailing view is that entrepreneurship was extremely high during the late 1990s in hi-tech locations such as Silicon Valley, there is no evidence in the academic literature from large-scale nationally representative data supporting this claim. The economic expansion of the 1990s undoubtedly created many opportunities for entrepreneurship and startups, but there also existed several factors that may have actually suppressed business creation during this period. The late 1990s represented a period in which the unemployment rate was falling rapidly, wage and salary earnings were rising, stock options and signing bonuses were becoming increasingly common, and investing in the stock market paid substantial returns.
In short, the opportunity costs to business creation may have been unusually high during this period. Therefore, it is an open question as to whether this was a period of heightened entrepreneurship or one in which the returns to working at firms were too great.
The limited evidence on the question appears to primarily be due to the lack of large, nationally representative panel data with information on hi-tech entrepreneurship. To address this limitation, we use a new measure of entrepreneurial activity to study business creation from 1996 to 2005 in Silicon Valley. Microdata from matched monthly files from the Current Population Survey (CPS) are used to estimate the rate of entrepreneurship. Although the crosssectional CPS data are commonly used to estimate static rates of business ownership, the matched data allow for the creation of a dynamic measure of entrepreneurship that captures the rate of business formation at the individual owner level. A major advantage of these data is that all new business owners are captured, including those who own incorporated or unincorporated businesses, and those who are employers or non-employers. Recent measures of entrepreneurial activity or firm formation typically include only larger, employer firm births, but these firms represent only 25 percent of all existing firms (U.S. Small Business Administration 2001 , and a significant number of new employer firms start as non-employer firms (Davis, et. al. 2006 ). An additional advantage is that unlike most business-level datasets that include limited information on the owner and no information on non-owners, the CPS includes detailed demographic information for the entire population allowing for an empirical analysis of the determinants of entrepreneurship. Although the data allow us to focus on hi-tech industries, we cannot examine separate patterns for venture-capital backed startups and employer firms, and 3 cannot capture entrepreneurs moving to Silicon Valley with existing businesses or to immediately start businesses.
Using panel data from the matched CPS and drawing from the prior literature in economics and management, several important hypotheses regarding entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley are tested. First, was business creation higher in Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States in the economic expansion of the late 1990s? The rapidly growing economy may have created many opportunities for startups, but wage and salary earnings and the opportunity cost of capital were also rising rapidly during this period. Second, Silicon Valley has a highly-educated population, which is associated with higher rates of entrepreneurship. Silicon Valley also has a large concentration of immigrants, which is associated with higher levels of overall entrepreneurship, while the effects for hi-tech entrepreneurship are unknown. Taken together, were entrepreneurship rates higher in Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States after controlling for these differences in education, immigration, and other demographic and work characteristics? Finally, did the downturn of the early 2000s reverse an upward trend in business creation or did business creation actually rise in Silicon Valley after the bubble burst? Interestingly, the comparison to the post-boom period may shed light on whether entrepreneurship was dampened in Silicon Valley in the late 1990s by the unusually tight labor market.
We find that business creation rates were 10 to 20 percent lower in Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States during the period from January 1996 to February 2000 based on estimates that control and do not control for the highly-educated workforce and other characteristics of the population. In the post boom period, we find that entrepreneurship rates in Silicon Valley increased while the national rate stayed essentially constant. These 4 entrepreneurship patterns are robust to alternative definitions of business formation that are less inclusive and focus on more successful types of businesses. Taken together, these results appear to challenge the conventional wisdom about Silicon Valley in the late 1990s -entrepreneurship was relatively low in the late 1990s compared to both the rest of the United States and the postboom period in Silicon Valley. We provide some preliminary evidence that the negative influence of high opportunity costs through a very tight labor market may have outweighed the positive influence of expanded entrepreneurial opportunities during the roaring 90s.
Theoretical Perspectives on Entrepreneurial Opportunities
This paper begins with the observation that numerous entrepreneurial opportunities were said to have existed in Silicon Valley during the late 1990s, but we have little robust empirical evidence that these opportunities were being exploited at a high rate. In fact, entrepreneurship may have been suppressed by the exceptionally tight labor market.
In the economics literature, a theoretical analysis of the choice to become a business owner has generally been based upon the relative earnings that a worker could obtain there in comparison with his or her earnings at a wage and salary job. The standard theoretical model of the entrepreneurial decision in the economics literature posits that two major opportunity costs to starting a business are wages in the labor market and returns to investing unspent capital (Evans and Jovanovic 1989) . There is also some empirical evidence that opportunity costs are an important factor in the decision to become an entrepreneur (Evans and Leighton 1989) , and that it is often weighed against the expected size of the new venture (Cassar, 2006) or the expected returns (Bhide, 2000) . Evans and Leighton (1989) find that low wages are associated with entry into entrepreneurship. Other research has emphasized that technological change can create variation in the number of entrepreneurial opportunities which are available (Shane, 2000) .
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While it is empirically difficult to measure the availability of entrepreneurial opportunities and opportunity costs, this logic provides several insights that are useful for thinking about entrepreneurship in the late 1990s. First, the economic boom of the 1990s provided strong consumer and firm demand for products and services provided by startups, thus increasing entrepreneurial earnings and associated opportunities. Although economic growth may have increased the returns to entrepreneurship nationally, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs may have gained even more because of the especially strong local economic conditions during this period.
Second, the increased use of the personal computer and Internet in the late 1990s may have also altered the classic production function, and the rapidly falling price of technology may have decreased the price of physical capital. Previous research indicates that high levels of investment in personal computers by small businesses during the late 1990s. More than 75 percent of small businesses used computers (Bitler, Robb and Wolken 2001, and Bitler 2002) , and self-employed business owners had high rates of computer ownership (U.S. Small Business Administration 2003). Small-and medium-sized businesses also made relatively large investments in computers and communication equipment (Buckley and Montes 2002) and 25 to 45 percent of total capital expenditures among relatively young employer firms are for computers (Haltiwanger 2004) . There is also direct evidence that access to personal computers increases entrepreneurship (Fairlie 2005) , possibly by making it easier to complete tasks needed to run a business such as accounting, inventory, communications, and advertising (Bitler 2002 ).
On the other hand, earnings in the wage and salary sector were increasing very rapidly during the late 1990s placing downward pressure on entrepreneurship. United States. In the San Francisco Bay Area, mean earnings rose from $42,000 to more than $58,000, which was far higher than mean earnings in California or the United States. The unemployment rate also dropped rapidly over this period of time (see Figure 2) . The unemployment rate in the San Francisco Bay Area fell to a remarkable low of 2.2 percent in December 2000. Overall, the late 1990s were a period when the returns to the wage and salary sector were at unprecedented levels.
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Although the late 1990s in Silicon Valley, California and the rest of the United States may have provided many opportunities for entrepreneurship, the increasing returns to Another factor creating downward pressure on entrepreneurship was the opportunity cost of capital. The returns to investing in the stock market were extremely high during this time period. Figure 3 displays the returns to investing in a few different assets over the 1996 to 2004 period. Investing $10,000 in the NASDAQ in 1995 would have grown to $45,000 from 1996 to 2000, and investing $10,000 in the SP 500 would have grown to nearly $22,000. Of course, investing in a less risky asset would have paid smaller returns, but many investors were placing a lot of money in the stock market at this point in time, and investing this money in a startup meant missing out on those returns.
The booming stock market, however, also increased personal wealth. In the presence of liquidity constraints, higher levels of wealth may have made it easier for entrepreneurs to find the 
The Special Case of Silicon Valley
Several scholars have identified particular characteristics of entrepreneurship in Silicon
Valley that are very difficult to measure empirically. One common argument is that the entire environment or "habitat" in the region appears to be favorable for innovation and entrepreneurship (Saxenian, 1994) . Various studies have emphasized the role of a highly educated and mobile workforce, a risk taking and failure tolerant culture, an open business environment that encourages creative thinking, leading research universities and institutes, extensive complementary services in law and venture capital, quality of life, and other factors that contribute to an unusually entrepreneurial environment in Silicon Valley .
Likewise, other work has posited that new venture creation is more common in "clusters" co-located with valuable resources (Stuart and Sorenson 2003) . Stuart and Sorenson argue that "the local nature of social capital suggests that new ventures will more likely begin in regions that offer ample supplies of the necessary resources." Since incipient entrepreneurs require social connections with potential resource providers, and resources are geographically concentrated, some areas, such as Silicon Valley, are predicted to have higher founding rates than others (Sorenson and Audia 2000) . However, these sociological drivers of clustering are difficult to separate from the economic spillovers that result from agglomeration (Krugman, 1991) . Industry agglomeration can also lead to the related phenomenon of entrepreneurial spawning (Chatterji, 2009) , where former employees of incumbent firms start new ventures in the same industry often 8 located near the original parent firm, adding to the agglomeration effects in regions such as Silicon Valley.
Although there are many reasons to suspect that Silicon Valley differs from the rest of the United States in the creation of hi-tech businesses, these factors are notoriously difficult to measure. These unobservable factors make it difficult to infer causes for any differences in entrepreneurship rates found between Silicon Valley and the rest of the country. To implicitly control for these difficult-to-measure factors, we take the empirical strategy of comparing business creation in Silicon Valley in the pre period (late 1990s) to business creation in Silicon Valley in the post period (early 2000s). Although the factors listed above did not change much during our sample period, economic conditions declined sharply, reducing the opportunity cost of entering entrepreneurship and also likely reducing potential entrepreneurial opportunities.
We use these changes to assess the level of high-technology entrepreneurship in Silicon
Valley from 1996-2005. We provide the first formal test of the conventional wisdom that there was more high-technology entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley during the "bubble" period of the late 1990s, and our finding suggests that the higher opportunity cost of entering entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley may have actually resulted in lower business creation rates than previously asserted, especially after controlling for demographics. Additionally, another test of the importance of opportunity costs comes from examining the post-boom period. Specifically, as opportunity costs decreased in the post-boom period, we might find that entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley increased even as entrepreneurial opportunities were declining due to worsening economic conditions. 
Measuring Entrepreneurship
Potential measures of the number of existing business owners or businesses are readily available from several nationally representative government datasets, such as the Survey of 10 Business Owners and the American Community Survey. Typical measures of business ownership based on these data, however, do not capture the dynamic nature that is generally implied when defining entrepreneurship. In particular, they do not measure business formation at the time the business is created. 4 To estimate the entrepreneurship rate, we first identify all individuals who do not own a business as their main job in the first survey month. By matching CPS files, we then identify whether they own a business as their main job with 15 or more usual hours worked in the following survey month. The entrepreneurship rate is thus defined as the percentage of the population of non-business owners that start a business each month. (Davis, et. al. 2006 ). Estimates of business formation from the CPS do not suffer from this problem because they include all new employer and non-employer firms.
One difference between estimates of business creation in the CPS and those from business-level sources is caused by the difference between business owners and businesses.
Multiple businesses owned by one individual count only once in individual-level data and businesses with multiple owners count only once in business-level data. These discrepancies are relatively minor, however. Estimates from the 1992 CBO indicate that the total number of business owners is only 12 percent larger than the total number of businesses (U.S. Census Bureau 1997) . Similarly, Boden and Nucci (1997) find that less than 3 percent of small business records in the CBO pertain to owners of multiple businesses.
Using the detailed industry codes available in the CPS we narrow the sample of business starts to only hi-tech and related industries. Although total business creation is important and can also be examined, we focus on hi-tech because of the potential for revenue generation and the character of Silicon Valley. For the main analysis, we include workers in all industries related to information, computers, software, pharmaceuticals, scientific and technical services. A complete list is available in Appendix A. We also check the robustness of results using alternative definitions of hi-tech and report some results for all businesses for comparison. Our main findings are not sensitive to the exclusion of specific industries. 
Entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley
As noted above, there is no evidence in the previous literature from a large, nationally representative dataset on patterns of entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley. Figure 6 and Table 1 business each month during this period. Silicon Valley also had a lower business creation rate during this period than the California total. Another interesting pattern that emerges from the data is that Silicon Valley has a higher entrepreneurship rate in the 6 year period after the peak of the NASDAQ than during the economic boom of the late 1990s. The entrepreneurship rate increased from 0.39 percent to 0.41 percent. The U.S. rate also increased, but only slightly 7 January 1996 is chosen as the start of the strong economic growth period of the 1990s for two reasons. First, although the trough of the business cycle was officially March 1991 and the national unemployment rate reached its peak in mid 1992, real GDP growth was not consistently high until the third quarter of 1995 (it was very low in the first two quarters of 1995). Thus, 1996 is the first year in which the unemployment rate was consistently declining and real GDP growth was consistently high. Second, it is not possible to create entrepreneurship data for 1994 and 1995. In these years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics re-randomized the identification codes making it impossible to match individuals over time. December 2005 is chosen as the end date for the post period because it was the last year of available data from the BLS and provides five full years of data after the dot com bust which corresponds roughly with the length of the boom period. It also captures a period when the NASDAQ was relatively steady and before unemployment reached its low point before the recession starting in 2007. We find that the estimates of entrepreneurship rates are not sensitive to the end dates of our analysis period.
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between the two periods. These findings are inconsistent with the common perception that the late 1990s were a period of unbridled entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley. Silicon Valley appear to be primarily driven by the San Jose MSA. 9 We find that the hi-tech entrepreneurship rate was 0.17 percent in the San Jose MSA for the late 1990s, which is lower than the Silicon Valley and U.S. rates. The business creation rate increased to 0.23 percent in the post-boom period. In contrast to these patterns the business creation rates for San Francisco and
Oakland MSA during the boom period were both higher than the national rate. Both rates were 0.64 percent for the late 1990s and their combined rate decline to 0.60 in the early 2000s.
10
Although the focus of our study is on overall business creation, it is also useful to examine whether there are differences between Silicon Valley and the rest of the United States in successful business creation. Ideally, business success would be gleaned from a dataset that follows new businesses or business owners over several years to determine whether they are
Although we continue to define the Silicon Valley as the broader region encompassing the cluster of hi-tech firms, it is reassuring that the patterns of hi-tech entrepreneurship that we find for Silicon Valley are even stronger when we focus on the center of Silicon Valley --the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara MSA.
Successful Entrepreneurship
9 The San Jose/Sunnyvale/Santa Clara MSA comprises 52 percent of the hi-tech labor force in Silicon Valley and 32 percent of the total adult population. The demographic characteristics of the San Jose/Sunnyvale/Santa Clara MSA do not differ substantially from those of Silicon Valley. 10 San Francisco and Oakland are combined in the post boom period because these PMSAs are combined in the later years of our sample period. 14 successful. However, to our knowledge, no long-term panel datasets exist with large enough sample sizes to focus on Silicon Valley and information on owner characteristics.
Entrepreneurship as measured in the CPS captures the creation of all types of businesses including non-employer, employer, incorporated and unincorporated businesses. To proxy for the types of businesses that might be successful we examine rates of business creation for two of these factors --incorporated businesses and employer businesses.
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We next examine whether the creation of incorporated hi-tech businesses was higher in
Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States. Owners of incorporated businesses represent roughly one-third of all business owners with these businesses often being more successful. Valley. Both patterns of employer business formation confirm those found above for the entrepreneurship rate using the CPS.
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In sum, the analysis of successful entrepreneurship does not change our conclusion regarding the two key empirical findings from the analysis of entrepreneurship rates in Silicon
Valley.
14 12 Even with a similar sample size, there is less relative precision for a variable with a very small proportion of ones than for a variable with a higher proportion of ones, which makes it difficult to identify statistically significant differences (see Cohen 1988 for example). 
Entrepreneurship in the Late 1990s
The initial examination of estimates from the CPS reveals that hi-tech entrepreneurship rates were lower in Silicon Valley than the rest of the country during the late 1990s. In this section, we further investigate the finding of a relatively low rate of business creation in Silicon 16 The importance of immigrants to Silicon Valley has been noted in the previous literature (Saxenian 1999 (Saxenian , 2000 . 17 The patterns are similar when examining the total population in Silicon Valley and the United States.
Nearly 32 percent of hi-tech workers living in Silicon
Valley are immigrants, with 20.9 percent coming from Asian countries. In contrast, the U.S. hitech workforce is 12 percent immigrant with 5.3 percent from Asian countries. The Silicon
Valley workforce also has a larger concentration of U.S. born Asians and slightly higher concentration of U.S. born Latinos, but has a lower concentration of African-Americans than the
United States total. Another major difference between Silicon Valley and the rest of the United
States is the education level of the hi-tech workforce. In Silicon Valley, 57.5 percent of the workforce has a college or graduate degree compared to the 42.9 percent in the United States.
Controlling for highly-educated workforce and other characteristics of the population in Silicon
Valley may result in even lower entrepreneurship rates relative to the United States.
An Empirical Model of Entrepreneurship
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To control for differences between Silicon Valley and the rest of the United States in these and other factors, multivariate regressions for hi-tech entrepreneurship are estimated.
These regressions are useful for identifying the determinants of entrepreneurship. The determinants of business creation can be explored by using the detailed demographic and employment information available in the CPS. The effects of gender, race/ethnicity, nativity, age, education, marital status, employment status, region, urban status, and home ownership on the probability of entrepreneurship are examined. The inclusion of these variables controls for geographical differences in demographic and employment characteristics and changes over time in these characteristics.
18 Table 4 reports marginal effects estimates from several probit regressions for the probability of entrepreneurship in hi-tech industries.
Although estimates of entrepreneurship rates have been created from the CPS, the determinants of entrepreneurship at the micro level have not been explored using the underlying data. Furthermore, a large literature explores the regional characteristics associated with firm formation, but these studies do not have information on the characteristics of individual business owners and focus on employer firm formation. Individual-level analyses using microdata improve on MSA-level analyses because they control directly for individual differences and implicitly for the main metropolitan area differences in detailed demographic and employment characteristics. In other words, the use of microdata accounts for MSA-level variation in the same measures.
19 18 Examining the entire adult population in Silicon Valley, we do not find evidence of strong trends in these individual characteristics from migration. There is some evidence of increasing shares of immigrant Latinos and Asians, but these appear to be smooth, slower moving trends over the period. We also might be concerned about individuals who are more entrepreneurial based on unobservable characteristics moving to Silicon Valley, but this would increase rates in Silicon Valley relative to the rest of the United States, making the underlying difference even larger. 19 Marginal effects are estimated using the coefficient estimates and the full sample distribution. They provide an estimate of the effect of a 1 unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability of entrepreneurship.
The base specification is reported in the first column. The probit estimates indicate that women are more likely to become hi-tech 19 entrepreneurs than men controlling for other characteristics. Although the results changes after we include additional controls below it contrasts with the common finding of lower rates of overall entrepreneurship among women (Parker 2010 Silicon Valley than our previous estimates indicated. 22 In Specification 2, we control for whether the individual was unemployed or not in the labor force in the first survey year. The coefficient estimates indicate that the unemployed and those not in the labor force are more likely than wage and salary workers to start businesses in the following month.
23 22 We also find a large negative coefficient when we include a separate dummy variable for the San Jose-SunnyvaleSanta Clara MSA. The coefficients on San Francisco and Oakland dummies, however, are positive and small. 23 Controlling for unemployment and NILF also changes the age function from being concave and generally negative to convex and generally positive. Taken together, these regression estimates clearly indicate that Silicon Valley in the "Roaring 90s" was not a place and time of exceptionally high rates of entrepreneurship.
Although Silicon Valley has a larger concentration of immigrants, which places downward 22 pressure on hi-tech entrepreneurship rates, the highly educated workforce, which is associated with higher rates of hi-tech entrepreneurship, and other factors more than offset the effect. The result is that entrepreneurship rates continue to be lower in Silicon Valley than the United States during the late 1990s. The mean differences and regression estimates indicate that entrepreneurship rates were roughly 10 to 20 percent lower in Silicon Valley.
Additional Estimates
We check the sensitivity of results to several additional specifications and samples. One concern is that we are comparing Silicon Valley partly to rural areas in the rest of the United
States, which might not be appropriate. As a robustness check, we exclude individuals living in rural areas from the sample. The determinants of entrepreneurship in rural areas may also differ from the determinants in more urban areas. Specification 4 of Table 4 Although not reported, we also check the sensitivity of results to larger metropolitan areas. Excluding small metropolitan areas, we find a coefficient estimate of -0.000746, which is similar to what we find using the full sample (reported in Specification 1). The coefficient remains positive and statistically significant. We also check the sensitivity to hours worked.
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Restricting entrepreneurship to individuals with at least 30 hours worked per week, we also find similar results for the Silicon Valley coefficient. Finally, we estimate the regressions using a logit model and a linear probability model and find similar marginal effect estimates. Overall, the reported estimates are not sensitive to alternative specifications, samples and estimation techniques.
Another concern is that immigrants in Silicon Valley differ from those residing in the rest of the country. We find that immigrants from India, China, Vietnam and the Philippines represent the highest shares of immigrant groups working in hi-tech industry in the Silicon
Valley. These groups also have high concentrations in the hi-tech industry in the rest of the United States, but much lower than in Silicon Valley. When we include detailed controls for these groups and several additional immigrant groups we find similar estimates for the Silicon Table 1 ).
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that large opportunity costs in terms of a very tight labor market in Silicon Valley in the late 1990s may have suppressed business creation during this period. As the labor market worsened after March 2000 in Silicon Valley, we would expect to see entrepreneurship rates rise. The change in labor market conditions was also much more 24 pronounced in Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States, which is consistent with the finding that entrepreneurship rates remained essentially constant in the United States from the pre-to post-boom periods.
This comparison between the pre-and post-boom periods is useful for testing our hypothesis regarding the importance of opportunity costs in determining entrepreneurship rates.
The comparison of pre to post periods implicitly controls for all of the factors that are unique to
Silicon Valley, such as the extreme concentration of established hi-tech firms, the presence of several leading universities and research institutes, and the distinct social networks among entrepreneurs. The major change in the post boom period was a decline in the local economy, possibly resulting in a substantial drop in the opportunity costs of starting a business. At the same time however, entrepreneurial opportunities may have also declined rapidly. Thus, an increase in business creation rates in Silicon Valley from the pre to post periods provides further evidence that is consistent with entrepreneurship rates being suppressed in Silicon Valley during the "Roaring 90s" due to an exceptionally tight labor market.
To explore this question more carefully, however, we need to confirm that the increase in entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley between the two time periods was not due to changes in demographic characteristics. We estimate probit regressions that include the full sample of observations from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 2005 and interactions with time periods (see Table 5 ). Specification 1 includes the basic set of controls for demographic characteristics.
Entrepreneurship increased in Silicon Valley from the boom period to the post-boom period relative to changes in the national rate of entrepreneurship. The business creation rate in Silicon
Valley increased by 0.024 percentage points after controlling for demographic characteristics and 25 changes in the U.S. entrepreneurship rate. This estimated change is identical to the actual change in the entrepreneurship rate of 0.024 percentage points.
Specification 2 reports estimates from a sample for only Silicon Valley. In this specification, the rest of the U.S. is not used as the comparison group. We are simply comparing entrepreneurship rates in Silicon Valley in the post to the pre periods after controlling for changes in demographic characteristics. The estimated change in entrepreneurship rates is positive and larger than the previous estimates. Thus, removing the implicit controls for the slight upward trend in the U.S. rate results in a larger increase in entrepreneurship rates in the post-boom period in Silicon Valley. We return to including the rest of the United States to control for changes in the macro-economy over this period.
The estimates reported in Table 1 indicate that other parts of California also experienced an increase in entrepreneurship rates in the post period. To control for these trends, we include a dummy variable for the rest of California and interactions with the post period (Specification 3
of Table 5 ). The estimates on the Silicon Valley post variable do not change relative to the main specification. Business creation rates in Silicon Valley increase in the post period, possibly because of opportunity costs declined.
Although the increase in entrepreneurship rates in the post period is consistent with the effects of declining opportunity costs outweighing the effects of declining opportunities for entrepreneurship, there may be alternative explanations for the change in entrepreneurship rates.
For example, workers may have fewer incentives to create spinoffs from large hi-tech firms in a boom period not only because of higher wages, but because capital is more available to large firms in boom periods. New projects in these firms can be funded more easily. Besides these novel findings that run counter to the conventional wisdom about Silicon Valley, our work provides additional insights for the academic literature on entrepreneurship.
First, our results suggest that in a strong economy, the number of entrepreneurial opportunities could indeed increase without commensurate increases in actual entrepreneurship. This result is driven by higher opportunity costs to entrepreneurship that dissuade some individuals from leaving salaried labor. Future theoretical and empirical research in management and economics needs to carefully consider the role of opportunity costs in the entrepreneurial decision.
Second, many cities in the United States and around the world are trying to emulate the Silicon Valley experience. The findings from this analysis indicate that, at least in terms of potentially creating high rates of entrepreneurship, the demographic characteristics of the population and economic conditions are important. In particular, having a highly-educated workforce is likely to lead to more entrepreneurial activity and not just having an environment or "habitat" favorable for innovation and entrepreneurship . Future research should examine these regional dimensions of entrepreneurship further, utilizing different datasets and empirical approaches, and aim to empirically assess the effects of both opportunities and opportunity costs. Hi-Tech Entrepreneurship, CPS (1996 
